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The Rules of the Game: “Play In The Joints” Between the 
Religion Clauses
Sharon Keller†
In law, as in life, there is a good deal of ambivalence about playing.  
Play, as the portal to innovation and creativity, can be the enemy of settled 
expectations and predictability. In the recent case of Locke v. Davey,1 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, appealed to the “play in the joints” 
metaphor famously used in Walz v. Tax Commission of N.Y.2 as an aid in 
† Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law.  M.A. University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, J.D. University of Pennsylvania.   I am grateful to my research 
assistants Kris Thompson.Delian Delchev and Nguyen Do for their assistance.
1 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004)
2
  The Court stated: 
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely 
straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, 
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constitutional balancing of apparently competing constitutional religion clause 
claims, saying:  
These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension.  Yet we have 
long said that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between 
them.  In other words, there are some state actions 
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by 
the Free Exercise Clause.3
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, 
and none inhibited.  The general principle deducible from the First 
Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not 
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental 
interference with religion.  Short of those expressly proscribed governmental 
acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality 
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 
(1970).
3 540 U.S. at 718-19; 124 S.Ct at 1311
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One of the more important tasks of law is to define and defend the 
expectations we loosely call rights,4 consequently it is unsettling to find “play” 
as an operant feature of a legal rule describing the interaction of two important 
constitutional clauses -- the clause prohibiting the establishment of religion and 
the clause guaranteeing rights to the free exercise of religion.5
This article will analyze the argument of Locke. I will lay out the 
significant elements of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses that 
created this tension in Locke and argue that the matter is not as simple as the 
Locke majority stated.  Rather, that the legal precedents that the Locke 
majority relied upon to resolve the Establishment clause challenge in Locke, in 
4
 I say “loosely-called rights” not because I will be contending that the term is very 
vague, but because one could coherently take a position that the expectations 
discussed in this article, particularly those in the discussion regarding conditioned 
benefits at section II.C. infra, do not rise to the level of right but are more properly 
viewed as “expectations” or “privileges.”   These arguments will be addressed in the 
aforementioned section.   Suffice it to say, for the purposes of the introduction, that it 
will be contended in that section that the consequences of such disappointed 
expectations need not rise to the level of right to have legal consequences in this 
instance.
5 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I
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particular Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,6 relies on presumptions that should 
elevate the level of scrutiny and eliminate much of the “play” in respect to the 
Free Exercise challenge. 
That this question arose in Locke should not be a surprise.  Indeed, this 
kind of conflict is nearly inevitable in cases where the Establishment clause 
issue is resolved by the application of the test found in Zelman.  Such cases 
usually begin with the application of the tripartite test of impermissible 
governmental involvement with sectarian institutions found in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,7 viz, that the governmental action must not be motivated by a desire 
to aid sectarian institutions, must not have the primary effect of promoting 
such institutions and must not foster excessive entanglement with sectarian 
institutions.  The test in Zelman relies upon the actions of a non-governmental, 
private “chooser” to resolve the entanglement and primary effect prongs of the 
Lemon test.  Therefore, cases resolved by Zelman will concern choices by a 
private chooser that result in a government benefit to a sectarian institution;  
any inhibition or pressure on the free expression of the private chooser’s 
religious preferences because of the nature of the choices the government 
6 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
7
 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
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makes available will then implicate the Free Exercise clause, creating the 
nearly inevitable tension between the clauses. 
In Locke the Establishment clause issue was resolved through the 
application of Zelman and then the Free Exercise issue was approached as an 
independent question of a condition on a benefit resolvable on a minimal 
rationality basis.  I will argue within that limiting conditions on the application 
of the Zelman test should mean that such problems cannot be settled so easily 
nor so compartmentally.  Rather, the application of Zelman itself requires a 
greater consideration of the burdening of the free exercise of religion than the 
Locke court applied. 8 
I. A. “Play” – The Problem as Presented in Locke v. Davey 
In the Locke case, the “play” arose when a governmental disbursement 
that benefited a religious educational institution, viz. the receipt of publicly 
funded scholarship tuition funds for Joshua Davey’s education, passed muster 
under the Establishment clause because of the intervention of a program of 
private choice by a private individual (viz. the scholarship recipient) who 
selected the school.  Such sanitizing choices are a key determinant for the line 
8 I suppose I am suggesting also that Locke v. Davey is wrongly decided but that, of 
course, is water under the dam. 
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of Establishment clause cases, in particular Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,9 that 
found government disbursements to religious organizations via such choices 
constitutional.  Hereinafter such choice mechanisms will be termed “Zelman 
choices” for convenience.  Locke is an exemplar of this new generation of 
Establishment clause cases that have written into law a safe harbor, private 
choice, for governmental benefits that find their way into the coffers of 
religious institutions in amounts that are neither incidental nor trivial.    
The scholarship program in Locke had an important restriction – it 
could not be used for study in the ministry,10 and this was the program and 
profession that Davey wanted to enter.  Consequently, in Locke the options 
presented in the private choice arguably infringed upon Free Exercise rights -- 
the dilemma that gives rise to the title of this article.   
9 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
10 The relevant Washington statute phrased the prohibition as “no aid shall be awarded 
to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology,” which the parties conceded 
meant degrees that “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith.”   Locke
at 1310.  As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent to Locke, the study of theology 
and preparation for the ministry are not necessarily the same thing.  Locke at 1320-21.  
The case is resolved by attributing the state’s administrative interpretation as applying 
the prohibition only to preparation for the ministry and this assumption will also 
inform this article.
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Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, the Locke Court’s analysis 
of the permissibility of the condition on the benefit (the exclusion of ministry 
studies) was based upon the argument that the government’s greater power to 
create a benefit subsumed the lesser power to condition the benefit (the 
“greater powers” argument).11 Justice Scalia would have employed a strict-
scrutiny equal protection test to the conditioned benefit, but I will argue that, 
under either test, the analysis of the conditioned benefit should be modified to 
take into account the presumptions that are incorporated in the “private choice” 
safe harbor and that these presumptions “tighten up” the “play in the joints.”  
In Locke Joshua Davey, the relevant individual chooser (for 
Establishment clause purposes) in the Zelman choice, claimed that the 
governmental limitations on his Zelman choice burdened his free exercise of 
religion.  It is here, I will say, where the “joint” of the metaphor is found – the 
“play” point where movement in one clause will cause the rights and/or 
privileges inherent in the other to bend.  As Justice Scalia argued in frustration 
in his Locke dissent, this “play” as a decision point seemed to him “not so 
11 See text infra section II.C .  For a full discussion of the “greater powers” doctrine see 
Brooks Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability 
Approach, 43 U.C.L.A. L.REV 371 (1995) 
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much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with 
competing constitutional directives.”12 
Locke was the second occasion that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
locked horns with the recalcitrant Washington State refusing to permit students 
to apply certain state scholarship funds to train in the ministry.  In their prior 
scuffle, Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind,13 a recipient of a scholarship, 
intended to help the blind train for a vocation, contested the same Washington 
State limitation on the funding, that is, excluding training for the ministry.  The 
Supreme Court of Washington State justified the restriction under the federal 
and the Washington State constitutions’ religion clauses.14 
12 Locke at 1317 (Scalia dissenting)
13
 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
14
 The U.S. Constitution religion clauses read: “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. I.   The Washington State religion clauses are differently worded: “Religious 
Freedom.  Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief 
and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or 
disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify 
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.  No public money or 
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property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction or the support of any religious establishment.”  WASH. CONST. ART. I § 11.   
Another provision of the Washington Constitution, referring directly to 
schools, was rejected by the Court as being inapplicable to the Locke case.  That 
section, stating “all schools maintained and supported wholly or in part  by the public 
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence,” Wash. const. art. IX § 
4, was challenged as a so-called “Blaine Amendment,” a product of nativist, anti-
Catholic sentiment of the late 19th century.   James G. Blaine, a republican 
congressman, led an unsuccessful attempt in 1876 to amend the federal constitution to 
explicitly prohibit federal and state legislators from “permitting in any degree a union 
of church and state, or granting any special privilege, immunity, or advantage to any 
sect or religious body … or taxing the people of any state … for the support of any 
sect or religious body… .”  Further, the amendments would prevent lawmakers from 
“levy[ing] any tax or mak[ing] any gift, grant, or appropriation, for the support, or in 
aid of any church, religious sect, or denomination, or any school, seminary or 
institution of learning , in which the faith or doctrines or any religious order or sect 
shall be taught or inculcated… .”  See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and 
State, 299 et seq. (2002).  The federal amendment failed in the Senate but the effort 
spawned a number of amendments to state constitutions.  Id.  The anti-catholic 
rhetoric in the discussion of these amendments raised a challenge to their validity as 
having an improper intent.  The Locke court declined to join the issue, finding that the 
arguable “Blaine Amendment” was not implicated, see Locke at 1314 n.7, leaving the 
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The U.S. Supreme Court found no bar in the U.S. constitution’s 
Establishment clause to the state singling out training for the ministry for 
exclusion from the scholarship program.15 That said, the remaining question, 
whether singling out the ministry as unfundable was an unconstitutional 
impediment to the student’s exercise of religion,16 was answered in the 
negative.  Hence the struggle to give substance to the Court’s explanatory 
metaphor of this result – that there is “play in the joints.” 
B.  Thesis in Brief 
My discussion will focus on the implications of a governmental action 
that presents a possible infirmity under the Establishment clause and impacts 
upon a person’s exercise of religion.   I will argue that where the Establishment 
clause concern is vitiated by employing a valid Zelman choice, there are 
implications for Free Exercise and these concern the degree of 
governmentally-created coercion in the choice for the chooser.  This question 
Blaine question for another day.  For a discussion of the Blaine amendments, see F. 
William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. Det. L.J. 137 (1963).  
15 See footnote 9, supra, discussing singling out the ministry is an interpretation of the 
Washington State constitutional language.
16
 The student also raised a free speech claim, disposed of perhaps too curtly by the 
court.  Locke at 1313 n.3.  
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is an empirical one that should be resolved on the facts of the particular case. 
First, then, the specifics of the Zelman choice will be analyzed. 
II. Zelman Choices and Their Limitations 
A. Zelman Choices Described 
The distribution of government largesse to religious institutions to 
advance their religious purposes is the essential bete noir of Establishment 
clause jurisprudence.   At the time of the ratification of the federal constitution 
several states had had statutory requirements that funneled or coerced public 
support to one state religion or to religions in general; the federal constitutional 
ban clearly barred such activity by Congress.17 This bar later was read into 
the limitations on actions by the states.18 
17
 Nine of the thirteen original colonies had established churches.  At the time of the 
adoption of the First Amendment only Massachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Connecticut still retained them.  See James E. Woods, Jr., THE FIRST FREEDOM 7 
(1990).  See also Leonard Levy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1 – 93 (1994).
18 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Education, 
331 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)
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Schooling, particularly the non-elite education of the general 
population, had historically been a task of religious organizations.19 As the 
task of promoting popular education became increasingly taken over by secular 
authorities as a duty of the state, the modern line of establishment 
jurisprudence developed.20 This line limited the extent to which public 
funding for popular education could be shared with the religious organizations 
who shared the same task; the bulk of modern Establishment clause cases have 
addressed religion in schools.21 
19
 For a comprehensive history of the development of popular education including the 
involvement of religious organizations, see the seminal history by the famous early 
progressive educator Elwood Cubberly, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION (1948)
20 See Levy, supra, at 149.  
21 Of the seminal cases on the Establishment clause, cases concerning public schooling 
make up a lion’s share.  See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(reimbursing parents for money spent on public transportation for children going to 
and from schools including, private schools); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203 (1948) (school board cannot offer religious classes in public schools); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibited school board’s official prayer); School Dist. 
of Abington Township v. Schempp et al, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no compelled Bible 
reading in public school); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidation of 
statute forbidding evolution courses because of its conflict with Biblical account); Bd. 
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Early cases used absolutist rhetoric about the “separation of church and 
state,” even where the results of the cases seemed to back-pedal on the 
strongly-voiced position.22 Language softened as justices seeking to 
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (statute requiring school districts to purchase 
and loan textbooks to private school students upheld); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971) (A statute concerning a number of programs aiding parochial education 
are invalidated using a three-part test which requires (1) government aid must have a 
secular purpose; (2) its effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the 
state must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.); Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (statute allowing parents to deduct tuition, textbook, and 
transportation expenses of their children upheld); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997) (title I courses permitted to be taught in private religious schools); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (statute providing government aid in materials and 
equipment to public and private schools upheld); Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002) ( government funding for tuition to parochial schools upheld). Cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a statute outlawing 
parochial education on substantive due process grounds).
22
 Some of the most quoted absolutist language on the Establishment clause is found  
in Justice Black’s Everson opinion, such as “The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not 
approve the slightest breach.” 330 U.S. at 18.   Nevertheless, the Court’s decision 
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accommodate religious schools looked for leeway in the religion clauses, 
particularly in funding and similar aid for parochial schools.23 This line of 
cases sought to “break the link” (that implicates the Establishment clause) 
between a governmental entity’s disbursement from the public fisc and a 
recipient religious school.   
Ultimately the desired break was accomplished by the mechanism of a 
private citizen making an intervening choice as to the recipient institution.  
This is at the crux of the Supreme Court decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris24 
that sanctioned a government program of vouchers for education redeemable at 
parochial schools in Cleveland, Ohio.  Under Zelman a link-breaking choice 
must have the following features: 1) the government’s disbursement program 
must have a legitimate secular purpose; 2) the enabling statute for the program 
must be facially neutral in respect to religion; 3) the relevant chooser must be 
acting as a private individual; and 4) the choice must be “independent and 
genuine.”25 
ultimately sided with the state in favor of the reimbursement of bus transportation 
expenditures as constitutional. 
23
 See cases and discussion infra in section II.B.3.
24
 536 U.S. 639
25
 536 U.S. at 49
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1) Legitimate Governmental Purpose.  However tattered Lemon v. 
Kurtzman26 may be, the “primary purpose” test, which requires a valid secular 
purpose for the legislation, remains good law.  It also remains the least 
challenging prong of the Lemon test, tending to elevate form over substance.  
Very few governmental programs have been so unwary as to be impaled on 
this prong.27 
2) Facially neutral.  The statute that provides for the benefit must be 
“neutral in respect to religion,” favoring no particular sect or doctrine on its 
face.28 Since a Zelman choice only arises when there is a possibility that 
public funds will be disbursed to a religious entity, facial neutrality requires 
26
 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
27 See Edwards v. Aguilard, 382 U.S. 578 (1986).  The Court found that the Louisiana 
State requirement that public school instruction in evolution be “balanced” by 
instruction in creation science had no other effective purpose than to introduce 
religious content into the school curriculum, commenting that “while the Court is 
normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the 
statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”  Id. at 587.  However, no 
subsequent Supreme Court decision similarly found sham purposes in Establishment 
cases.
28
 536 U.S. at 652
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that “the program is made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.”29 
3) Private Chooser.  The program in question “provides assistance 
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to 
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent 
private choice.”30 This condition addresses both the identity of the chooser 
and the nature of the choice.  The relevant chooser must be a private individual 
as opposed to, say, a public employee acting as an agent of a governmental 
body. 
4) An Independent and Genuine Choice. Locke’s criteria for the choice 
to be  “genuine and independent” include that there is no coercion or skewing 
of the choice toward religious institutions by the government program.31 
There seems to be no similar requirement that the program not be skewed 
towards the non-sectarian choices.32 The Court argues that the program at issue 
“in fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with private 
29
 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), cited and followed in Locke at 651. 
30
 536 U.S. at 652
31
 536 U.S. at 653, 654
32 See Zelman at 653-54.  
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schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community 
schools and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools.” 33 
At first blush one wonders how the choice can be “independent and 
genuine” where there is no parity between the sectarian and public school 
choice.  Would this not mean that the chooser is being pushed towards the 
community and magnet schools?  However, this is not the coercion the Court 
considered at issue; rather, it is the right in the chooser not to be coerced 
unduly to participate in a religious institution.  That is, the Free Exercise right 
of the person to be free of religious compulsion was implicated.34 Left 
unfulfilled and substantially unaddressed is the affirmative side of Free 
Exercise -- a right in the chooser to choose in accord with religious preferences 
without that choice being burdened.35 
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., West Va. St. Bd of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(unconstitutional to punish children refusing on religious grounds to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (unconstitutional to compel 
students to participate in a non-denominational prayer); School Dist. V. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (unconstitutional to compel students to participate in Boble reading in 
public schools).
35
 Moreover, placing the religious institution in a disadvantaged position invites a Free 
Exercise analysis as well on behalf of the religious institution.  The Cleveland system 
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B. Conforming the Zelman Choice to the Lemon Test 
Although a citation to Lemon v. Kurtzman36 is conspicuous by its 
absence from the majority opinion in Locke, unless and until it is explicitly 
overruled it remains the summary of necessary conditions for the 
constitutionality of governmental interactions with religious institutions that 
raise a question of the establishment of religion.   
Lemon’s disjunctive tripartite test itself is an attempt at a summary of 
prior lines of religion clause jurisprudence that remain good law on their own: 
(1) that the statute must have a secular purpose; (2) that the statute’s principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; nor 
(3) can the statute foster an “excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”37 
in Zelman placed the religious private school in no more disadvantaged a position than 
a secular private school, in the Court’s view yielding a facial neutrality.  Zelman at 
653-54.
36
 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
37 Lemon at 612-13.  Subsequent phrasings of the test have conflated part one with part 
two, stating, for instance, that the government did not act with the purpose or primary 
effect “of advancing or inhibiting religion.”  Zelman at 649.   The rephrasing is not 
identical in meaning to the language in Lemon since it suggests, for instance, that a 
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The line of cases relied upon in Zelman rhetorically differ from earlier 
cases such as Lemon.  For convenience in explaining the difference I will label 
the two approaches arguments based on prohibitions (“Ap”) and presumptions 
of propriety (“Pp”); the reason for choosing these particular labels will become 
clearer infra as the approaches are described in greater detail.  The change in 
rhetoric in the cases forming the foundation of Zelman also changed the nature 
of the Establishment clause inquiry, rendering it more empirical and 
consequently, it should also be more burdensome for the governmental party.   
 1. Arguments Based on Prohibitions 
The structure of an argument based on prohibitions is one in which 
definite prohibited actions or conditions are laid out, and then the action or 
condition at issue is described and compared to the prohibited actions.  If the 
action or condition at issue contains a reasonable risk of crossing into the 
prohibited ones, then that action is considered itself improper.   
In Lemon, for example, the Court invalidated a salary supplement to 
sectarian teachers by such an argument.  The relevant prohibited condition is 
the teaching of religion financed by public funds, that “government is to be 
statute that intentionally inhibits a religious institution from its mission might be 
constitutionally suspect under the Establishment clause as well as the Free Exercise 
clause.  Cf.  Church of Lukumi-Babalu v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 510 (1993).  
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entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction.”38 Despite testimony 
by sectarian teachers that they would not be interjecting religion into their 
publicly-financed teaching of secular subjects, and the trial court finding that 
“religious values did not necessarily affect the content of the secular 
instruction,”39 the Supreme Court considered the hazard intolerable: 
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial 
schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design 
to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First 
Amendment.  … With the best of intentions such a teacher 
would find it hard to make a total separation between 
secular teaching and religious doctrine.  …Further 
difficulties are inherent in the combination of religious 
discipline and the possibility of disagreement between 
teacher and religious authorities over the meaning of the 
statutory restrictions. 
We do not assume however that parochial school teachers 
will be unsuccessful in their attempts to segregate their 
religious beliefs from their secular educational 
38 Lemon at 625
39 Lemon at 618
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responsibilities.  But the potential for impermissible 
fostering of religion is present.”40 
Absent from the Court’s Ap approach is a willingness to wait and see if 
the improper activity occurs, indeed, even if the probability is necessarily 
likely.  “Lines must be drawn,”41 states the Court and the logical possibility 
weighed more heavily than an empirical approach.  “Mere statistical judgment 
will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to finance 
religious education.” 42 
The great exemplar of the Ap approach is the opinion in Everson v. 
Board of Education43 by Justice Black, who was never shy about drawing 
absolutist lines in the sand: “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.  Neither 
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of 
40 Lemon at 619 (emphasis added)
41 Lemon at 625
42 Nyquist at 778
43
 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
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Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State’.”44 
We find similar statements in other Ap cases, e.g. Grand Rapids School 
Dist. v. Ball45 ("Although the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit 
government financed or government sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs 
of a particular religious faith.") and Meek v. Pittenger,46 stating that the District 
Court erred in relying entirely on "the good faith and professionalism of the 
secular teachers and counselors," since the state must “be certain,… that . . 
.personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related 
schools."47 
In sum, while the actions of individuals are culpable only if a statutory 
line is crossed in fact, the governmental program is to be judged improper if it 
opens a door wide enough to admit of a statutory violation easily committed, 
whether likely or not.  
 
2. Presumptions of Propriety 
44
 Everson at 16. 
45
 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)
46
 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
47
 421 U.S. at 370
S. Keller, Rules of the Game
 DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR
26279-text.native.1126856032 Page 24 of 75 
Justice O’Connor declared that the court had progressed beyond the Ap 
approach in Agostini v. Felton, stating that “we have abandoned the 
presumption erected in Meek and Ball that the placement of public employees 
on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of 
state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between 
government and religion” adding that “such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated 
notions of ‘taint’ would indeed exalt form over substance.”48 Certainly some 
change in the law must account for the difference in results between Aguilar 
and Agostini since there was no change in the facts.49 
48
 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) quoting Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
49 Agostini was brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requesting 
relief from a final judgment, that is, the judgment in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 
(1985), because it is “no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application” if the petitioning party can show “a significant change in factual 
conditions or in the law.”  The court did not find that there were any significant 
factual changes.  Agostini at 216.  Rather the case turned on an alleged change in the 
law, citing, e.g. Zobrest and Witters. See the discussion infra section II.B.3.
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Justice O’Connor dates this explicit sea change in Establishment clause 
law to Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District50 which, with its 
predecessors Mueller v. Allen51 and Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind,52 form the precedential basis for the Zelman choice.  
Zobrest concerned the provision of a sign language translator to a deaf student 
at a parochial school pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act.53 Specifically repudiated is Justice Souter’s Ap-style explanation of the 
result in Zobrest that attempts narrowly to categorize the translator task as one 
that will not implicate the forbidden possibilities.   Rather, Justice O’Connor 
specifically admits to the possibility that the translator, a government 
employee, might have the opportunity to inculcate religion in the translating 
activity and took Zobrest to mean: “that public employees will be not be 
presumed to inculcate religion.” 54 
What does Justice O’Connor mean by “presumption” and “presume” in 
the language quoted above? Generally a presumption in the law is “any matter 
50
 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
51
 463 U.S. 388 (1981)
52
 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
53
 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.
54
 Id. See also discussion at section II.B.(3)(c) infra.
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of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise than by reasoning, as the 
basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of fact.”55 Generally a 
presumption effects evidentiary burdens at trial: a presumption can render 
some factual situation as legally sufficient for a prima facie case or shift the 
burden of production or persuasion to the party that does not receive the 
benefit of the presumption.56 
True presumptions are defeasible and can be rebutted.  They are “the 
bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine of actual 
facts.”57 There are differing theories among evidentiary scholars as to how 
much sunshine is required and exactly where the bats go when they disappear, 
but that is beyond the scope of this article.58 Suffice it to say that a true 
55
 James B. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 141, 143 (1889)
56
 9 Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2499 (1981)
57
 Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. James & Council Bluffs RR, 196 Mo. 550, 570, 94 
SW 256, 262 (1906).
58
 A famous dispute arose between two preeminient scholars of evidence, James 
Thayer and Edmund Morgan, on the effect of rebuttal upon a presumption.   One 
view, attributed to Thayer, treated a presumption as “fix[ing] the duty of going 
forward with proof,” and if rebutted the presumption was destroyed and no longer a 
consideration in the case.  See James Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on the Evidence 
at the Common Law, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 352 (1953).  This effect of rebuttal on the 
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evidentiary presumption is rebuttable, so presumptions – such as someone who 
has disappeared and not been heard from in seven years is dead, that a letter 
properly addressed and posted was delivered, that a thing which someone 
possesses is owned by that person,59 or liability based upon res ipsa loquitur60 
– can all be placed in doubt by competent evidence.  
However, there is a second use of “presumption,” commonly called 
“conclusive presumptions,” that is disowned by evidentiary scholars as having 
“no place in the principles of evidence.”61 These are rules of substantive law 
that, certain facts having been established, render a legal conclusion 
unassailable by contrary factual showings.62 For instance, such “conclusive 
presumption was characterized as the “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions.  See 
Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, I12 
Stan. L. Rev. 5, 17-18 (1959).   Morgan considered the Thayer theory to give too little 
effect to presumptions and felt that the opponent of a presumption bore a burden both 
of introducing evidence and of persuasion.  See Edmund Morgan, Some Observations 
Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv. L.Rev 906, 927 (1931).
59
 Wigmore EVIDENCE §2492
60
 W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS §§39, 40 (4th ed. 1971)
61
 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2492
62
 “Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense 
that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the 
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presumptions” can be established by statute as where a worker’s compensation 
statute requires, for the purpose of those proceedings, any widow(er) of a 
covered decedent to be treated as having been wholly dependent on the 
decedent.63 
A third usage of “presumption” is the casual usage wherein the word is 
simply synonymous with “assumption,” and is used to describe some 
conclusion that a reasonable person would tend to draw given the particular 
facts of a matter. 64 
The Pp argument, as quoted in the language from Agostini, above, 
introduces presumptions of regularity in governmental behavior as factors in 
second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that where the first fact is shown 
to exist, the second fact’s existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the 
proponent’s case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law and not a 
rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the 
duty of coming forward with evidence.”  Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2492
63 See Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfullfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions,
62 N.C.L.REV 697,700 (1984), citing N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 97-39 (1979).
64
 Cf. “The act of presuming or accepting as true.  3. Acceptance or belief based on 
reasonable evidence; assumption or supposition.  4. A condition or basis for accepting 
or presuming.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th 
Edition. 2000)
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the entanglement and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test.  What sort of 
presumptions are these – true presumptions, “conclusive” presumptions or 
mere assumptions?  There can be only one answer to this.  If they are mere 
assumptions they would be common sense judgments founded in the particular 
facts of a particular case somewhat like judicial notice of a fact, and could not 
be the foundation of any generalizable legal rule.  If they were “conclusive” 
presumptions the Court would be presuming as a matter of law the precise 
inquiry of the entanglement and effect prongs and thereby rendering them a 
legal nullity.  Therefore they must be ordinary legal presumptions, rebuttable 
by facts. 
So, in the treatment of the issue in Agostini and Zobrest, the Court 
relied upon a presumption of regularity in the behavior of the public employees 
in order to overcome Lemon’s effect and entanglement prongs.  That the Ap-
style arguments entail a presumption of misbehavior by governmental 
employees seems to be a mischaracterization of the argument, since it is 
sufficient for the Ap argument if there are insufficient or entangling safeguards 
against the forbidden behavior whether it is likely or not that the public 
employee will stray from properly executing his or her duty. 
The use of such a presumption introduces a complication that the Ap 
approach had been able to avoid.  The Ap approach is entirely defeasible only 
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by a showing that no realistic opportunity to misbehave is present.  This is a 
fairly high standard and the burden of persuading that no such possibility exists 
is on the proponent of the disputed statute.  Empirical showings that the 
employees in fact have not misbehaved are beside the point for the Ap 
argument.  Consequently the AP argument neither needs nor employs any true 
presumption in respect to the public employees once it is established that there 
is a real possibility of an insufficiently policable opportunity to misbehave.   
This difference in rhetorical approach between Ap and Pp is marked in 
the Court’s analyses of the effect and entanglement Lemon prongs.  It is not a 
new feature of the purpose prong because that test, with the notable exception 
of Edwards v. Aguilard, nearly always reviews the language of statute facially 
and lets the legislature enjoy a true presumption (of the first kind) of regularity. 
The Pp approach carries over this tack into its analyses of the other Lemon 
prongs. 
The Pp argument should be vulnerable then to empirical data and 
requires an investigation of the question: What circumstances justify the 
presumption? To answer this question the precedent cases for the Pp approach 
can be read to provide the conditions for establishing presumed regularity; that 
is, the precedent cases for Zelman, discussed in the next section following,  can 
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provide guidance as to the substantive limits on when and under what 
conditions such  presumptions can obtain. 
 3. Interpreting the Zelman Precedents’ Limits on Presumptions 
a. Zelman Presumptions and the Interplay of Lemon’s 
Effect and Entanglement Prongs 
To recap, the function of the presumptions of the Pp argument in a case 
like Locke is to navigate the rocky relationship between the primary effect 
prong of Lemon and the entanglement prong.  In order to avoid the effect of an 
act from impermissibly benefiting religious institutions where such a potential 
exists there must be some sort of safeguard.   If those safeguards require an 
intrusive policing of the religious institution by the state then the act will run 
afoul of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.   
There are two ways to limit the potential of an impermissible act:  to 
presume certain acts will be sufficiently unlikely to occur as to reduce the 
potential to de minimis level (the Pp approach); or to forbid the action entirely 
or require the government to police the program (within the confines of the 
entanglement concerns) to assure that the impermissible act will not occur (the 
Ap approach).   The advantage of the Ap approach is that it does not run the 
same risk of triggering the entanglement problems.  The disadvantage is that to 
be sound it should require a justification that can withstand facts and statistical 
data and there should be an agreement as to what constitutes de minimis.  
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Financial grants to religious schools have been found permissible when 
they are carefully tailored to avoid financing religious functions, for instance, 
in Tilton v. Richardson65 where federal construction grants for university 
facilities were approved for church-related universities.  The grants could not 
be used for construction of “any facility used or to be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place for religious worship or … any facility which  … is 
used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a 
school or department of divinity.”66 The Court also took into account that the 
curriculum of the school was not so pervasively religious that the subjects 
taught in the buildings would amount to religious instruction.67 
65
 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
66
 403 U.S. at 675, quoting the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. 
§751(a)(2).
67 The opponents of the Act argued that a sectarian institution generally “imposes 
religious restrictions on admissions, requires attendance at religious activities, 
compels obedience to the doctrines and dogmas of the faith, requires instruction in 
theology and doctrine, and does everything it can to propagate a particular religion.”  
403 U.S. at 682.  The Court acknowledged that some institutions had been found 
ineligible for grants but pointed out that no such showing had been made for the 
institutions at issue in Tilton. Id.
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The Tilton Court gave a four-part test for their analysis, adding to the 
three prongs of Lemon a fourth condition that the statute not be found to inhibit 
the free exercise of religion.  In this case the fourth prong addressed a claim by 
the complainants of a taxpayer injury because of the governmental grants to 
the sectarian institutions.  The Court dismissed the charge given that they were 
not able “to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their 
religious beliefs” and the tax burden would be no more significant than the 
burdens approved in Walz.68 The Court did not consider whether there was any 
burden on the religious institutions by the limits on their use of the facility.  
Despite presenting the test as though it had four prongs, the Court handled the 
Free Exercise claim as a separate inquiry, as do I in this article. 
In any event, money from scholarships, as is the case with Locke, is not 
earmarked and a sectarian institution would be able to apply those funds to any 
of its functions.  A direct, unrestricted grant by the government to a sectarian 
institution would not pass Establishment clause muster like the narrowly 
tailored and monitored grant in Tilton.69 Even if the there was a finding of an 
appropriate secular purpose, such a grant would likely fail as having a primary 
68
 403 U.S. at 689
69
 The grants in Tilton were monitored for 20 years and religious use of the buildings 
so financed triggered penalties against the institution.  403 U.S. at 675.  The Court 
invalidated the limit of 20 years.  403 U.S. at 683-684.
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effect of advancing religion and/or engendering an extensive entanglement by 
monitoring the use of general funds.    
In the case Lynch v. Donnelly70(in which a public Christmas display by 
a town was ruled constitutional) Justice O’Connor proposed an alternative test, 
the “endorsement test,” for determining the constitutionality of the effects 
covered in Lemon under the constitutional test for improper primary effect.71 
70 465 U.S. 668 (1983)
71 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (1983):
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is 
properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government 
practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, 
advancement or inhibition of religion. The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, 
educational, and charitable organizations), in McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time from school for off-
campus religious instruction), had such effects, but they did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.  What is crucial is that a 
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message 
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only 
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, 
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Although it has not displaced Lemon it is not infrequently cited so in the 
interest of thoroughness, I will include this consideration in the following 
summaries.   
First there is the Lemon/Lynch prohibition under the Establishment 
clause in which the government may not give to a sectarian institution a grant 
of money that is not limited in its uses to only secular activity: 
 
Second, there is the Zelman approach to an unconditional government 
grant: 
that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in 
the political community.
Lemon/Lynch/Tilton




Government Grant ------------>Private Chooser -------------------- > Religious Institution
(supported by presumptions
of regularity)
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Obviously the private chooser must fulfill the functions represented by 
the “limits” in the Lemon/Lynch/Tilton model.  The foundational cases for the 
Zelman choice are Mueller, Zobrest and Witters.  In each of these cases the 
impermissible acts, the presumptions about the actors and the standard for de 
minimis effect should be examined to ascertain what are the standards for Pp 
presumptions. 
 b) Mueller v. Allen 
 At issue in Mueller was a Minnesota statute that allowed state 
taxpayers to deduct from their income taxes expenses incurred in providing 
tuition, textbooks and transportation for their school-aged children.    Some 
exemptions under the statute would have been permissible even as 
expenditures directly by the state such as provision of secular textbooks 
directly to students under Board of Education v. Allen,72 and transportation 
under Everson v. Board of Education. 73 However, as of the time of Mueller 
no direct payment to religious schools had been found to be constitutional so if 
the deductions were the functional equivalent of such prohibited payments the 
tax scheme would appear to be unconstitutional.    
72
 393 U.S. 236 (1968)
73
 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
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The prohibited act would be an improper expenditure by the state in aid 
of parochial schools, especially to the extent that it can be perceived as a stamp 
of approval (or “imprimatur”) of sectarian schools; the relevant presumption is 
that the state’s method of distributing the benefit could not achieve such an 
effect except in an insignificant and incidental way, through distributing a 
general benefit through tax deductions available to all parents whether their 
children are in public or private schools, and whether their private school is 
sectarian or not.  “[Neutrally provided] state assistance to a broad spectrum of 
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment clause.”74 
Hence, the unwieldiness of the tax deduction mechanism of distributing 
aid as a vehicle for government preferences for sectarian projects leads to a 
presumption that the government, reduced to policing only in its usual and 
unobtrusive activity of evaluating deductions listed on tax forms, is neither 
engaged in an activity with a prohibited degree of advancing religion nor 
entangling itself in it.  Deciding that the tax-mechanism does not easily permit 
the government to manipulate private actors to do what the government cannot 
do directly, the area of activity sanitized by the presumption leaves a small 
area to be controlled by policing. 
74 Mueller at 398
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The rebuttal of the presumption would be to show that the mechanism 
is rife with the high probability of just such a manipulation.  In the dissents just 
such a rebuttal is undertaken pointing out that the deduction required that the 
parent have spent an amount in excess of $700 and those parents who send 
their children to public school “are simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit 
of the deduction except in the unlikely event that they buy $700 worth of 
pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their school-age children.” 75 
The Court, in passing, notes that empirical evidence of special benefits 
to religions “might be relevant to analysis under the Establishment Clause,”76 
insofar as they are probative of demonstrating that the questioned program is 
productive of “the evils against which the Establishment Clause was designed 
to protect.”77 “What is at stake as a matter of policy,” reminds the Court, “is 
preventing the kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a 
political system to the breaking point.”78 The Court reflects that “at this point 
in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers” the framers of 
75 Mueller at 409
76 Mueller at 397 n.7
77 Mueller at 399
78 Mueller at 400
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the Constitution had in view in the late 18th century, presumably meaning the 
acts of various states that sponsored specific religious institutions.79 
79 Mueller at 400.  Nevertheless, in the matter of parochial schools, a digression giving 
some history may be instructive.  In the early 19th century we find religious 
institutions very actively engaged in providing popular schooling and the City of New 
York was eager to encourage the practice.  Schools were one method of serving one’s 
flock while recruiting new adherents for various churches.  Unfortunately, the poorer 
element of New York was not at the top of the churches’ list for recruitment, leaving 
the area short of schools.  Jail often became regarded by the young in these districts as 
their trade school and New York’s city fathers were deeply concerned about the trades 
to be learned there. In addition to common thievery, the proliferation of child 
prostitution was of great concern. See Carl Kaestle, EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN 
SCHOOL SYSTEM (1972) at 112-120. The historical novel The Alienist by Caleb Carr 
was not merely being lurid with its plot centered on a child prostitution ring; it was 
also narrating phenomenon of 19th century New York that was not as uncommon as 
one might hope. 
It happened that the religious commitments of the Society of Friends included 
moral precepts that both valued public service and specifically deplored proselytizing.  
Because they were not seeking to recruit, the Quakers readily embraced the task of the 
education of the poor without regard to their students’ religion nor with the intention 
of confronting or changing it, therefore they were even more eager than most to step 
into a perceived underserved educational task. This is certainly not to say that other 
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religions did not form any schools for the poor.  There were and still are admirable 
religious groups engaged in ministry to the poor through education but the Free 
School Movement in New York City had its genesis in the Society of Friends.  
Having stepped into a perceived social vacuum of substantial concern to the 
city fathers, New York City gratefully provided a great deal of public support for the 
Free School Movement. The congruence of the Quakers non-sectarian approach to 
education and the government’s interest in remaining neutral in respect to religion 
created a circumstance wherein the Quakers became a preferred provider because of 
their particular articles of faith.  The Quakers in their turn zealously guarded the 
grants of public funds that enabled them to work with the poor and they became 
vocally involved in the competition with other sectarian schools for public support.  
Jealousy and enmity between religious providers ensued.  Eventually the City of New 
York took over the Free Schools which became the nucleus of their public system of 
schools. See Kaestle at 159-164.  And see generally Elwood P. Cubberly, History of 
Education (1922). 
My point is that the possibility of real establishment problems are not 
as far behind us as the Supreme Court might wish.  In countries with no 
comparable barriers to state support for religious projects we see intimations of 
what can happen when religious institutions become too dependent on the 
public fisc.   In the 1990’s the coalition government of Ehud Barack received 
its deathblow when it attempted to change the regulation and funding of 
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c) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 
 In Zobrest a deaf child attending a Roman Catholic high school in 
Tucson, Arizona challenged a refusal by the school district to provide to him a 
sign-language interpreter pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”).80 The school district denied the request based on 
their understanding of the Establishment Clause, reasoning that “the interpreter 
would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of [the student].” 81 
Both parties conceded that the IDEA was secular and neutral on its face 
with no impermissible legislative intent; the effect and entanglement prongs of 
Lemon were the issue.  The circumstances of the case suggested three possible 
prohibited scenarios: (1) a public employee paid to engage in the religious 
schools in which the sect/political party Shas was heavily invested. See Joshua 
Brilliant, Government to Abolish Religious Affairs Ministry, United Press 
International (Sept. 3, 2000).Of course the United States is not a parliamentary 
system, but that is mostly irrelevant to the point.  Certainly the United States 
has organized sectarian political interest groups with a marked influence on 
American politics.  
80
 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
81 Zobrest at 5
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indoctrination of the student;82 (2) a public employee will be engaged in an 
activity that is perceived as a governmental endorsement of a religious 
message; and (3) a governmental benefit or payment will accrue to the benefit 
of a sectarian institution, aiding it in its religious mission. 
The Court’s answer to (1) and (2) is a presumption that the interpreter’s 
actions will constitute nothing more than being a mere, virtually mechanical, 
conduit, adding no increase, emphasis or elaboration of the proselytizing 
message: 
Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language 
interpreter would do more than accurately interpret 
whatever material is presented to the class as a whole.  In 
fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to ‘transmit 
everything that is said in exactly the same way it was 
intended.’  [The student’s] parents have chosen of their 
own free will to place him in a pervasively sectarian 
environment.  The sign-language interpreter they have 
82
 Unlike institutions of higher education, elementary and secondary parochial schools 
are presumed to be unable to separate their religious mission from their educational 
mission.  Consequently having the interpreter interpret only for secular subjects would 
not be a solution for this alleged Establishment Clause violation.  
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requested will neither add to nor subtract from that 
environment and hence the provision of such assistance is 
not barred by the Establishment Clause.83
The Court suggests that this same transparency, coupled with the fact 
that the public employee is present only at the parent’s behest, should be 
sufficient to deal with the appearance of endorsement. 84 
The presumption reduces the entanglement by assuming it adequate 
that the state need not police to ensure that no impropriety occurs, but rather 
only to do little more than act if one does occur and is brought by chance to the 
attention of a relevant authority.  A similar presumption, a little more subtle, 
underlies the Court’s treatment of (3): 
[U]nder the IDEA, no funds traceable to the government 
ever find their way into sectarian school’s coffers.  The 
indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might receive 
by dint of the IDEA is the handicapped child’s tuition – and 
that is, of course, assuming that the school makes a profit 
on each student; that without an IDEA interpreter, the child 
83 Zobrest at 13
84 Zobrest at 11
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would have gone to school elsewhere; and that the school, 
then, would have been unable to fill that child’s spot.85
Under this description the economic advantage to the school is 
incidental and “attenuated.”  This evaluation is true although only to the extent 
that the small number of possible IDEA candidate students make the market 
advantage to the school of the additional personnel virtually nil. For instance, 
that presumption should fail for a sectarian school that marketed itself as 
especially desirable to special needs children and it intended to substantially 
rely upon public employees funded through the IDEA to provide services 
necessary for those children.  Note that under this Pp approach the rather real 
possibility that sectarian schools might suffer a market disadvantage by being 
ineligible for IDEA is of no consequence. 
d. Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the Blind 
 
Witters has essentially the same facts as Locke v. Davey. A blind 
student wished to apply his Washington State scholarship to training for the 
ministry, which the Washington State statute prohibited.   This case is 
remarkable among the cases in this section both for the fact that it is the only 
opinion that was not authored by Justice Rehnquist and for the, no doubt 
85 Zobrest at 10-11
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related, fact that the Witters decision, as authored by Justice Marshall, is not a 
Pp but an Ap argument.   
Justice Marshall disposed of the troublesome Lemon effect and 
entanglement prongs by finding that the expenditure of the scholarship funds 
was not properly attributable to the state, drawing on, inter alia, an 
unconvincing comparison to a state employee using his salary check to support 
his church.86 
No doubt Witters is found in this list of precedents because of the 
language of the separate concurrences by Justices Powell and O’Connor in 
which Justice Rehnquist joined.  These opinions cast the result as an extension 
of Mueller (not cited in the Marshall opinion) and the scholarship in Witters 
was deemed constitutional because the “benefit to religion resulted from the 
numerous private choices of individual[s].”  Thus recast, the argument rested 
upon the Pp assumptions about the sanitizing effect of private choice, 
condemning the Ap approach of the Washington Supreme Court wherein the 
scholarship was invalidated because it “had the practical effect of aiding 
religion in this particular case.”87 The concurring Justices preferred to “look 
86 Witters at 486-487
87 Witters at 492 (emphasis in the original)
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at the nature and consequences of the program viewed as a whole.”88 But, of 
course, that is the whole difference between the Ap and Pp approaches.   
For the Ap approach a single counter-example is sufficient to 
invalidate.  The Pp approaches sweeps the relevant actions together with a 
broad brush and attributes what it deems the likely action to all the actors as 
their presumed course.  Then, for the purposes of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, that presumed action is the only action that needs to withstand 
the tests of the Establishment Clause. 
e.  A Summary of the Use of Presumptions in the 
Zelman Precedents. 
Some “choices” are shams, for instance the mugger’s “your money or 
your life.”89 No meaningful choice was presented and the law refuses to treat 
88
 Id. (emphasis in the original)
89
 This, I think, is the general view.  There are those who argue that the mugger’s 
proposition is a real choice. Richard Posner has taken the position that both the victim 
and the mugger are exercising “free will” as the victim willingly makes the choice to 
pay the mugger for his forebearance. See Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 101 (1986).    Such a position may be reasonable in an abstract argument about 
market behavior, but, given that the ultimate concern in evaluating choice in the 
context of Zelman choices is that the choice be “independent and genuine” I believe 
that even Judge Posner would not characterize this choice in that way.
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actions taken pursuant to the coercion inherent in the sham choice as freely-
made choices. Nevertheless, in many choices daily our options are slim; no 
grocery store will bargain with you over the cost of their goods – the sale price 
is the only choice, take it or leave it.   Most of our contractual lives are 
occupied by contracts of adhesion; our democratic institutions may offer us 
only two choices for our leaders and our options generally are limited by time, 
location, status, income or gender, not to mention luck.    
Similarly the choices of those faced with Zelman choices may be 
serendipitously limited by conditions unrelated to the statutory scheme. If the 
blind student in Locke v. Davey had a personal fortune, or if he had qualified 
for other scholarships without the limitations of the Washington grant, the 
decision to take the Washington grant and forgo training for the ministry 
certainly could not be characterized as a pressured one.  The validity of the 
statutory scheme cannot be expected to rise or fall on the accidental features of 
the various citizens who may be affected by it.90 Nevertheless, given that one 
90
 Some accidental features, of course, may call the statutory scheme into question in 
special circumstances, e.g. race, gender etc.  Wealth discrimination however has not 
been found to trigger any heightened scrutiny and will not alone impugn the 
governmental program.  See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 28-29  (1972) ( In refusing to extend strict scrutiny to a statutory program 
that disadvantaged the school districts of the poorer citizens the Court commented that 
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of the stated necessary conditions for a valid Zelman choice is that the choice 
be “independent and genuine”91 it must be asked “independent of what?”  
At the crux of the precedential cases for Zelman are presumptions and 
these presumptions concern the behavior of the government actors – that they 
will not abuse their positions, that their actions will be proper.   The 
presumptions are not based upon a carefully researched inquiry into what the 
government is likely to do or even able to do but on the propriety of the tasks 
the statutory scheme places upon the governmental actors only when they 
perform their duties correctly.  The presumptions did not begin and end with 
the actions of employees like the Zobrest translator.  There is the presumption, 
as in Mueller, that the statutory scheme is properly formed in such a way that 
“the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not 
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process).
91 Zelman at 652, Locke at 1311.  And see text supra at section II.A.
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the government engaged in employing it would be acting only in an 
appropriate way for appropriate ends.92 
An assumption such as this is found in Zelman itself, wherein the 
majority that found that the Ohio vouchers distributed to parents for use in 
private schools did not have the primary effect of supporting religion.   Justice 
Souter countered that the vast majority of private schools (82%) participating 
in the program were parochial and received 96% of the voucher funds.93 How 
could that not constitute a primary effect of aiding religion?  How can it be 
reconciled with Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist,94that found much smaller allocations to parochial schools via tax 
credits for parents had impermissible effect?  
Justice Rehnquist in reply pointed out that the proportion matched the 
percentage generally of parochial to private schools in the city,95 adding that 
the matter was of no relevance since the proportion of participating schools did 
92
 The inquiry under Ap would be if there is a real risk that the program is capable of 
misuse, that is, the inquiry is not limited to how things would turn out if everything 
went exactly according to plan.
93 Zelman at 703 (Souter dissenting)
94
 43 U.S. 756 (1973)
95 Zelman at 
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not reflect any activity by the government but simply an incidental fact about 
the demographics: “to attribute constitutional significance to this figure, 
moreover, would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program 
might be permissible in some parts of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower 
percentage of private schools are religious schools … but not in inner-city 
Cleveland … where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be 
greater.”96 
That is, as long as the government was taking the school situation as it 
found it and did nothing to create the situation, it was acting neutrally and 
within the strictures of the Establishment Clause. As for Nyquist, the fatal flaw 
there was that the function of the program in question “was unmistakably to 
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions”97 
because public schools were not able to participate in the program.  That is to 
say, the government’s program by design was to create a skew in the benefits 
towards the parochial schools.  If Cleveland’s design of its programs was 
shown to create and exploit a skew in the benefits towards religious institutions 
96 Zelman at 657
97 Zelman at 661 (emphasis in the original).  Although this language suggests that the 
purpose prong of Lemon was offended, the program in Nyquist failed for offending the 
primary effects prong.  See Nyquist at 780, 783.
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then it would seem then that under Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning Cleveland’s 
program would fail under the Nyquist precedent. 
Therefore, whatever else “independent and genuine” means for Zelman 
choices, it must mean that the chooser must be free from actions prescribed in 
the governmental program that, even when working exactly as intended, skew 
or distort the chooser’s choice.
C. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions  
and Zelman Choices 
 
Zelman choices concern governmentally distributed benefits, and the 
conditions on the receipt of benefit schemes can run afoul of the constitution.    
Stated simply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that “the 
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary 
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that 
benefit altogether.”98 The doctrine appeals to basic sensibilities about justice 
– that rights under the Constitution should not be destroyed or alienated by the 
state either directly, by lop-sided bargains or by stealth.   Yet this doctrine is a 
troubled one in that there is widespread disagreement about the meaning and 
application of this rule and, indeed, as shall be seen, even of its rationale. 
98 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 
(1989).
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For the purposes of this discussion of Zelman choices, I submit that the 
qualifications on the choices that sanitize government schemes touching on 
establishment of religion under Zelman, viz. that the choice must be 
“independent and genuine,” imposes even more stringent limits on permissible 
Zelman choice schemes than the garden-variety doctrine of “unconstitutional 
conditions,” particularly as it was applied by the Locke court.   
Obviously it is tautological to say that a scheme must be invalidated if 
it entails unconstitutional conditions.  However, as I will argue, “independent 
and genuine,” not being a necessary factor in testing for unconstitutionality of 
conditions, should be treated as an additional factor in assessing the 
constitutionality of Zelman choices, viz., the Establishment clause inquiry.  
That is, that even a “very-close-to-unconstitutional” condition should be 
enough to defeat the Zelman choice’s sanitizing effect since the standard 
“independent and genuine” can be violated by acts that fall short of outright 
unconstitutionality.   
Put another way, the Zelman choice sanitizes just because the 
government surrendered control of the distribution of the benefit to private 
hands so completely that the government can no longer be viewed as the 
benefactor nor the endorser of the ultimate, recipient religious institution.  If 
the independence of the private chooser is too compromised by the government 
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then the government has not surrendered control in a way that takes away the 
appearance of an endorsement and the primary effect of benefiting religion. 
1.  Analyzing Conditioned Benefits 
Conditioned benefits are common but troublesome cases and the courts, 
to be sure, have not shown much consistency in describing which kind are 
permissible and which kind are not.   Difficult to reconcile paradoxes abound, 
for instance, conditions upon the editorializing of public broadcasters,99 or the 
advertising by casinos100 that burdened freedom of speech were found 
constitutionally impermissible while burdens upon the speech of family 
planning counselors101 and limitations on certain tax-exempt organizations to 
engage in political activity102 were not found to be unconstitutional conditions. 
One problem in analyzing the permissibility of conditioned benefits is 
that their analyses summon dueling characterizations: four approaches to the 
analyses of possible unconstitutional conditions will be described in more 
detail below.  They are: (1) the conditions are merely a refusal by the state to 
99 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
100
 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 
(1986)
101
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
102
 Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
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subsidize an activity; (2) the conditions are inappropriately exacting a penalty 
of the actor for making the choice; (3) by accepting the state’s choice the actor 
is waiving a right; (4) the state’s creation of the choice is improper when 
viewed systemically.
Refusal to subsidize / Exacting a penalty. One way to characterize the 
benefit in Locke could be as a statutorily conditioned benefit where the state, 
under no obligation to create scholarship benefits at all, is permitted to create a 
scholarship program which limits itself to something less than the broadest 
availability that the constitution will permit. The majority in the Locke case 
argued that refusing a scholarship for Joshua Davey was simply a 
governmental refusal to subsidize his particular whim to become a minister, 
while for the Locke dissenters the government was exacting a penalty on 
Davey, forcing him to lose a free exercise right to follow a religious calling.   
The characterization of a conditioned benefit -- as a mere refusal to 
subsidize as opposed to a penalty -- is truly a glass-is-half-full or half-empty 
debate.  Justice Rehnquist held that “the state has merely chosen not to fund a 
distinct category of instruction” under the scholarship program applicable to 
Joshua Davey, and “it does not require students to chose between their 
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”103 However, argued 
103 Locke at 1312
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Justice Scalia, “When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that 
benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are 
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals 
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than 
if it had imposed a special tax.”104 What is at stake is whether the condition on 
the benefit will trigger strict scrutiny.  If the burden and “baseline” is as Justice 
Scalia describes it, the condition will have to endure a separate, rigorous and 
probably fatal strict scrutiny test,105 while the review of the majority ends with 
the facial neutrality of the statute where the court “cannot conclude that the 
denial of funding for vocational religious instruction is inherently 
104 Locke at 1316
105
 Once finding the condition subject to strict scrutiny Justice Scalia would extend the 
rule of Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 510 (1993) to these 
facts:
If a state deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we 
do not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the 
evil the Constitution prohibits.  It is sufficient that the citizen’s rights have 
been infringed.  It does not matter that a legislature consists entirely of the 
purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for 
special burdens.  (In part quoting Lukumi at 559)
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constitutionally suspect.  Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, 
Davey’s claim must fail.”106 
The majority, in supporting the state’s right to limit the scholarship, 
appealed to an often-cited underlying rationale for conditioned benefits: that 
the greater power of the state to refrain entirely from granting a benefit entails 
a lesser power to limit the benefit.  The “greater powers” argument has a long 
history107 in American jurisprudence but not a clear one, despite its misleading 
patina of self-evidence.  At one point Justice Brennan, despite having 
employed the doctrine himself just a few years before,108 dismissed it as a 
106 Locke at 1315
107
 The first mention of the doctrine in a Supreme Court case can be found in Justice 
McLean’s concurrence in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 504 (1841), but 
there are earlier references in Supreme Court literature.  For a more comprehensive 
history of the doctrine see Fudenberg at 375 n.17 and references cited therein.
108 Justice Brennan called the doctrine “discredited” in City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 n.8 (1988) but in Northern Pipeline Constr. 
Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18 (1982) he argued that Congress’ 
“power to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the lesser
power to create administrative agencies for the same purpose.” See also Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825. 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
S. Keller, Rules of the Game
 DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR
26279-text.native.1126856032 Page 57 of 75 
“discredited doctrine” – which the Court proceeded to apply again in the same 
year.109 
Both Justices Scalia110 and Rehnquist have appealed to the doctrine, 
although Justice Rehnquist, in addition to being the author of Locke and 
primary author of the Zelman line of cases, has been, more than any other 
justice, the one who took up the mantle as its foremost advocate111 from Justice 
O.W. Holmes, who famously articulated the strong greater/lesser powers 
position first when he was a state judge in the cases of Commonwealth v. 
Davis112 and McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,113 the latter case best known 
109 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408, 433 (1989)
110
 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825.
111
 Justice Rehnquist authored seminal cases concerning conditioned rights, notably 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) which upheld the receipt of federal family 
planning funds conditioned upon an agreement to refrain from abortion counseling.  
See also John R. Hand, Note, Buying Fertility: the Constitutionality of Welfare 
Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 
715, 739-440 (1993) (examination of Rehnquist’s position in 29 unconstitutional 
conditions cases). 
112
 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)
113
 20 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)
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for the oft-quoted “[A policeman] may  have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”  That is to say, 
the greater power of the state to create the employment included the lesser 
power to make conditions on the employment.   Justice Rehnquist reiterated 
that position in Arnett v. Kennedy,114 where a public employee whistle-blower 
challenged his discharge and the procedures that governed it, since his pre-
termination appeal rights were to appeal to the supervisor that he had exposed.   
In finding that the statutory procedures were constitutional despite their 
dissonance with the due process expectation of an unbiased decisionmaker 
Justice Rehnquist argued “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably 
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in 
determining that right, a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the 
bitter with the sweet.”115 
Similarly Justice Rehnquist in Locke would have it that Joshua Locke 
must accept the “sweet” of the scholarship with the bitterness of having one of 
his possible educational and professional goals frustrated.   However, Arnett 
itself was explicitly overruled in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
114
 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
115
 416 U.S. at 152-154
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Loudermill,116 the Court’s majority expressly rejecting the application of this 
“bitter with the sweet” approach in the context of due process procedures for 
benefit terminations.117 While Loudermill may have made some clarifications 
in the law about procedural due process, it was by no means a death knell for 
the greater/lesser powers argument.  Applying greater/lesser powers 
arguments, Justice Rehnquist won over the majority in Rust v. Sullivan,118 
upholding the government’s right to condition family planning funds on a “gag 
rule” for the discussion of abortion, and, more recently, rejected an 
“unconstitutional conditions” challenge in U.S. v. American Library Assoc. 
Inc.,119 to the Children’s Internet Protection Act120 which conditions library 
subsidies on their filtering internet content, stating that “within broad limits 
116
 470 U.S. 532 (1985)
117 The Court held:
In light of these holdings, it is settled that the “bitter with the sweet” approach 
misconceives the constitutional guarantee.  If a clearer holding is needed we 
provide it today.  …While the legislature may elect not to confer a property 
interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the 
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate 
procedural safeguards.  470 U.S. at 541.
118
 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
119
 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
120
 114 Stat. 2763A-335
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when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is 
entitled to define the limits of that program.”121 
Waiver.  Waiver suggests something deliberately and freely entered 
into as part of a bargain.  It smacks of something unsavory when the rights 
granted to citizens to protect them from overbearing governmental interference 
are overcome by the government’s unequal bargaining power.  
Where an individual chooser who has been offered a “Hobson’s 
choice” to surrender some right or privilege to obtain another the coerciveness 
and quality of the choice offered is an important element.  In most ethical 
analyses, certainly those of a deontological bent, coercion is an assault upon 
the autonomy of an individual with two elements usually presented as 
necessary conditions: (1) a significant degree or kind of compulsion, and (2) an 
intention on the part of the one compelling to control the other’s action.122 
Coercion in its pejorative sense means the compulsion and the intention 
are wrongful in degree or kind and is often discussed in conjunction with legal 
121
 539 U.S. at 211
122 See, e.g., Peter Westen, “Freedom and Coercion” – Virtue Words and Vice 
Words, 1985 Duke law Journal 541, 589 (defined as a constraint knowingly brought to 
bear on another to act in a way that that will leave the other worse off)
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standards for duress.123 Yet wrongfulness admits of degrees.  Most would 
agree that a choice is wrongfully coerced if made under a threat of torture or 
wrongful incarceration, or if the government’s intention were of the sort that 
would be invalidated under the intent prong of the Lemon test.  Unfortunately 
Locke v. Davey presents no such easy case – wrongfulness of the deprivation 
of the scholarship is neither entirely self-evident nor indisputable. 
Moreover, most choices in day-to-day living are constrained – one must 
cross the street only where there is a crosswalk; one gets potato soup because 
the store does not stock vichyssoise; one attends law school part-time because 
one cannot afford to go full-time; one is constrained by the Justice Department 
from acquiring one’s competitor.   Indeed, coercion is considered a hallmark of 
the state, even a sine qua non for state power; that being so, the mere fact the 
government is behaving coercively cannot be sufficient for resolving the 
question of whether the waiver is proper.   Something more is needed to show 
why a waiver should be deemed invalid.124 
123 Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 Va L. Rev. 79, 88 
(1981)
124 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights 
in a Positive State, 132 U.PA. L.REV 1293, 1295 (1984): 
[M]uch constitutional thinking centered on limiting the use of 
coercive force or criminal sanctions through which government has 
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Some commentators add that the waiver suggests that rights are up for 
sale, an undesirable commodification of those rights that were intended to act 
as a check on governmental powers and therefore, arguably, should be 
inalienable.125    There is some support in case law that the forcing of a waiver 
traditionally exerted its authority to deter undesirable conduct.  
However, the conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive 
violence has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on 
a government that more often exerts its power by withholding 
benefits than by threatening bodily harm. …Increasingly visible 
governmental actions substantially impinge on individual lives 
without invoking the threat of mayhem or incarceration.  The greatest 
force of modern government lies in its power to regulate access to 
scarce resources.”
125 See, e.g. Kreimer at 1387-93:
The case for recognition of waivers rests on the 
conviction that constitutional rights protect individual 
choice.  But many constitutional rights protect other 
values or protect individual choice only as a means to 
the realization of other ends.  For such rights, there is 
no paradox in asserting that the choice of the 
individual should not decide the applicability of the 
right in question. …To the extent that a right is the 
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is an improper coercion by the government in, for example, U.S. v. Butler126
and its progeny.   Butler invalidated a state requirement that foreign 
corporations waive their right to bring cases in federal court as a condition of 
doing business in the states; the subsequent application of the arguments found 
in Butler have been erratic.127
result of a definition of the structure and power of 
government, an individual decision to waive it is 
irrelevant.
See also Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); 
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 478 
(1981).  For a more sympathetic view of a market in rights see Richard A. Epstein, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 5 (1988).
126
 297 U.S. 1 (1936).  See also Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922)  
(State cannot force waiver of right to resort to federal courts as a condition for doing 
business in the state).
127
 Shortly after deciding Butler the Court declined to apply it in Steward Mach. Co v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (decided on other grounds) wherein a claim was made that 
the Social Security Act of 1935 unconstitutionally conditioned funds upon the state’s 
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Systemic impropriety.  Other analyses of conditioned benefits, in 
particular, those of Kathleen Sullivan, have focused upon the systemic effect of 
conditioned benefits: 
[Such conditions] implicate the boundary between the public and 
private realms, which government can shift through the allocation of 
benefits as readily as through the use or threat of force.   … [T]hey 
permit circumvention of existing constitutional restraints on direct 
regulation.  The second distributive concern of unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine is the maintenance of government neutrality or 
evenhandedness among rightholders.  The third is the prevention of 
constitutional caste: discrimination among rightholders who would 
otherwise make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of their 
relative dependency on government benefit.128 
Under this systemic approach the court would “subject to strict review any 
government benefit condition whose primary purpose or effect is to pressure 
recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty 
passage of unemployment compensation legislation.   Yet the rule in Butler was not 
specifically overruled.
128 Sullivan at 421
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or a direction favored by government.”129 Her analysis argued that the 
constitutional limitations on government encroachment on guaranteed liberties 
regulates relationships between government and rightsholders and between 
classes of rightsholders.130 She divided the latter category into horizontal 
relationships (rightsholders for whom the tradeoff is not unacceptable or is no 
sacrifice as opposed to those for whom it is) and vertical (rightholders who 
differ, for instance, by economic class in their ability to resist the tradeoff of 
rights), which Professor Sullivan termed “Constitutional caste.” This systemic 
approach would require strict scrutiny of any conditioned governmental benefit 
that substantially impinged upon the “distributive concerns” enumerated in the 
quote above.   
 What is important about all of these approaches and particularly the 
systemic approach is that, no matter whether a question of conditioned benefits 
will pass muster under the Free Exercise clause, when it must do so in 
combination with a Zelman-based Establishment clause defense, the question 
of coercion, regularity of governmental actors and propriety of governmental 
behavior goes to the heart of the presumptions that justify the treatment of the 
Establishment clause question under Zelman.    
2.  Zelman Choices as “Unconstitutional Conditions Lite” 
129 Sullivan at 1499
130
 Sullivan at 1491.
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An “unconstitutional conditions” inquiry begins with an invasion of the 
rights of an individual chooser who has been offered a “Hobson’s choice” to 
surrender some right or privilege to obtain another and the coerciveness and 
quality of the choice offered is an important element.  While coercion often is 
applied as a lynchpin in many Free Exercise decisions, intuitive because it  
goes to the sense of injustice in the burden on religious freedom, I believe 
coercion is less relevant in respect to Zelman choices.131 As I have suggested 
earlier, the importance of any aspect of coercion is not that it need go so far as 
to overcome the religious scruples of the person compelled nor invalidate a 
waiver but that it casts a shadow on the alleged independence of the Zelman 
choice. 
131 In most ethical analyses, certainly those of a deontological bent, coercion is 
an assault upon the autonomy of an individual with two elements usually as necessary 
conditions: (1) a significant degree or kind of compulsion, and (2) an intention on the 
part of the one compelling.  See, e.g., Peter Westen, “Freedom and Coercion” –
Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 Duke law Journal 541, 589 (defined as a 
constraint knowingly brought to bear on another to act in a way that that will leave the 
other worse off).
In coercion in its pejorative sense the compulsion and the intention are 
wrongful in degree or kind and is frequently discussed in conjunction with legal 
standards for duress.  See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard 
Choices, 67 Va. L. Rev. 79, 88 (1981)
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Hence, while there is general agreement that the government may 
pursue goals with a carrot that it cannot attempt to achieve with a stick, in 
statutory schemes where there is, so to speak, of a-carrot-with-a-stick-inside, 
there seems no similar general agreement of how to cast the inquiry – with 
focus on the loss or on the benefit. The greater/lesser powers argument has 
inconsistent results. The more visceral attacks on conditioned benefits have 
focused upon the coerciveness of the conditioned benefit, although the degree 
and kind of coercion sufficient to invalidate is not easy to quantify and is 
probably not reached in a case like Locke.
Moreover, for the greater/lesser argument, the coercion argument and 
the waiver argument there is a good deal of confusion as to establishing the 
baseline against which the putative loss of the right is to be measured.132 The 
dissent may or may not have the better argument that the condition ought to 
fail if properly subjected to heightened equal protection scrutiny but this is not 
the only apparent hurdle for constitutionality because, as I see it, the Locke 
majority has laid down more factors than simply the equal protection hurdle.   
Hence, while a demonstration that a statute offends equal protection obviously 
will invalidate an action, it is not necessary that a burden must rise to the level 
132 See Kreimer at 1351-72.
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of invalidity under equal protection in order to be so excessive that it 
undermines the requirement that a choice be “independent and genuine.” 
The systemic argument reaches more of the Zelman concerns because 
the Establishment clause is a systemic concern.  Even more unambiguously 
than Free Exercise or equal protection, the Establishment clause addresses the 
constitutional design for government in the U.S. and its legitimate concerns. 
Professor Sullivan’s approach directly addressed the legitimacy of government 
pressure on citizen rights as a systemic matter.   The more the governmental 
scheme systemically pressures and reduces the options realistically available to 
the Zelman choosers, the weaker the rationale for recognizing a sanitizing 
effect by the Zelman  choices. 
This argument is addressed, although not in this form, in Zelman itself.  
Justice Souter’s dissent argued that the aid at issue in the Zelman predecessors 
Mueller, Zobrest and Agostini was found by the court to be insubstantial 
viewed systemically and did not have the effect of skewing choices.133 He 
found the program in Zelman however to skew in favor of the participation of 
parochial schools in the voucher plan because of the small amount of the 
voucher subsidy, which closely approximated the relatively lower tuitions of 
privates schools that were sectarian, and the large proportion of sectarian 
133 Zelman at 2490
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schools participating in the voucher program.134 “The question is,” Justice 
Souter stated “whether the private hand is genuinely free to send the money in 
either a secular direction or a religious one.”135 The majority responded by 
reiterating the facial neutrality of the statute at issue, which does not join the 
issue, and re-evaluating the empirical data, which does.136 
Similarly, the question in Locke v. Davey and other Zelman-style 
Establishment clause cases cannot avoid the empirical facts regarding the 
situation of the putative chooser, questions that cannot be addressed through 
neutral principles nor the level of coercion required for Free Exercise tests 
because, as was demonstrated above, the foundation of Zelman and the cases 
upon which it depends are based upon defeasible presumptions the behaviors 
of the actors involved and the systemic effect of the statute at issue. 
 
III. “Play in the Joints”  
A. The Source of the Metaphor 
The case was Walz v. New York City and the language was 
memorable:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area [of 
religious rights] cannot be an absolutely straight line; 
134 Zelman at 2493-2495
135 Zelman at 2492
136 Zelman at 2460
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rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these 
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored 
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.  The 
general principle deducible from the First Amendment and 
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not 
tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental religion.  Short of those expressly proscribed 
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit 
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.137
In Walz a New York landowner and taxpayer challenged the property 
tax exemption for churches in New York.  His argument, as summarized by the 
Supreme Court, was simply that the “grant of an exemption to church property 
indirectly requires … a contribution to religious bodies and thereby violates 
[the establishment clause].”138 That is, if a governmental forgoing of revenue 
from the churches is to support them monetarily and support of religions is 
prohibited by the constitution then, a priori, foregoing revenue is 
137
 Walz v. City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
138
 397 U.S. at 667
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constitutionally prohibited.  Frederick Walz, appearing pro se, considered the 
proposition -- that exempting churches from taxes was governmental support -- 
sufficiently self-evident as to require no more than a 2 1/2 page appellate brief 
to assert it.139 The New York Court of Appeals’ per curium opinion, as 
though to return the favor, offered about the same amount of verbiage to 
dismiss Walz’s claim out of hand, by citing precedent that supported the 
constitutionality of the statutory exemption without venturing into the 
arguments or logic of the decisions.140 Walz relied upon an a priori argument, 
the Court on stare decisis, both rather rigid positions from a jurisprudential 
139
 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 31 (1969)
140
 The Court of Appeals’ opinion in its entirety stated that: 
Firmly embedded in the law of this State … is the doctrine that real 
property owned by a religious corporation and used exclusively for 
religious purposes is exempt from taxation [citations] and research 
discloses – and the 2 1/2-page brief of the plaintiff-appellant herein 
cites no authority to the contrary – that courts throughout the country 
have long and consistently held that the exemption of such real 
property does not violate the Constitution of the United States.  
[citations omitted].  We see no reason for departing from this
conclusion in this case.  Walz, 24 N.Y. 2d at 31.
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point of view and in their own way, apples and oranges.  Because it did not 
revisit the logic of the precedents, the Court of Appeals itself did not truly join 
the question that Walz had raised; similarly Walz, by citing no precedent for 
his position, did not join the Court’s argument.    When the matter was taken 
up by the U.S. Supreme Court, the path not taken – a factual inquiry  -- was 
undertaken.   
The Burger decision in Walz rejected Frederick Walz’s position by 
disputing one premise that the logical argument rested upon -- that the 
prohibitions in the religion clauses should be read as absolute; then the court 
was free to review the aid factually and decide to reject Walz’s necessary 
assumption that the tax breaks were “support” within the meaning of the 
establishment clause.  Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of 
Appeals’ simple reliance on precedent.  It was in rejecting these a priori 
approaches141 that led the Supreme Court to wade into evaluating the realities 
of the case’s facts.  Herein is where the court found “play,” determining that 
141
 I consider the Court of Appeals’ argument to be a priori (or very nearly so) insofar 
as their conclusion necessarily must flow from their premises that there is only 
precedent supporting upholding the tax exemption and that precedent must be 
followed.  It leaves only the inquiry whether the statement about the precedents is 
true.   
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“the test will be one of degree,142” and what follows in the decision is a 
weighing of the nature of the interaction permitted by the exemption statute.143 
What I seek to emphasize at this point is this – the movement away 
from absolutes and bright lines and towards weighting factors produces the 
“play” that resolves Walz; but in order to be properly law like, predictable and 
just, that “play” needs principles.  Certainly the Walz decision goes on to lay 
out some principles, just as Locke sets out its guidelines that are at the heart of 
142 Walz at 678
143 The factors Walz took into consideration included a quantitative 
effect:  
Separation in this context cannot mean absence of all 
contact; the complexities of modern life inevitably produce 
some contact and the fire and police protection received by 
houses of religious worship are no more than incidental 
benefits accorded all persons and institutions within a 
State’s boundaries, along with many other exempt 
organizations.  The appellant [Walz] has not established 
even an arguable quantitative correlation between the 
payment of an ad valorem property tax and the receipt of 
these municipal benefits.  Walz at 678.
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the enquiry in this article.   Important to such facts-and-circumstances tests are 
the acceptable ways in which factors are evaluated and, as I have argued supra,
the jurisprudence can be clouded by the use of presumptions and burden–
shifting.  Such rhetorical moves displace principled absolutes with under-
examined presumptive second cousins that only appear to be empirical; and 
their employment should be viewed skeptically if “play” is not to become 
synonymous with result-oriented arbitrariness. 
 To summarize my argument, the Supreme Court has developed a 
mechanism, described herein as a Zelman choice, whereby disbursements from 
the public fisc can be distributed to parochial pockets provided that the choice 
of the recipient is left to individuals exercising an independent and genuine 
power of choice.  Such programs require that the relevant statute be for an 
appropriate secular purpose and facially neutral, thereby satisfying the “secular 
intent” prong of the Lemon test.   
 The “primary effect” and “entanglement” prongs of the Lemon test are 
addressed (1) by a requirement that the scheme, even if retaining the possibility 
of actions by state actors improper under the establishment clause, has so 
reduced the arena of state activity that state actors presumed to be behaving 
within the parameters of their regular duties would not be expected to engage 
in such actions even if unpoliced; and (2) that the legislature has so distanced 
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itself from the individual determinations of where and whether to divert to 
funds to parochial institutions that the effect on their economic is truly out of 
the state’s hands and in those of independent choosers and it would not be 
reasonable to consider such an attenuated manner of payment “endorsement.” 
 This being the case, any substantial limit on the “independent chooser” 
must be closely scrutinized.  This is so not because the limits are a question of 
facial neutrality, as the Locke court wrongly thought; nor because there may be 
an unconstitutional impingement on the chooser’s personal rights.  Rather, the 
heightened scrutiny should be required because the limits undermine the 
presumptions of chooser independence and governmental distance necessary 
for an acceptable Zelman choice, which rests on a presumption of systemic 
regularity. 
 Thus, in Locke v. Davey, a determination that Joshua Davey’s choices 
were hampered in a manner that showed the sort of systemic deficiencies as 
described above should undermine the applicability of Zelman because it 
challenges Zelman’s necessary presumptions. Without the Zelman short-cut 
through the effects and entanglement prongs of Lemon, the old rules apply:  
there will have to be a showing of no primary effect and bearing the 
entanglement risk in policing them.    
 
